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As Good as it Gets? Security, Asylum,
and the Rule of Law after the Certificate
Trilogy
GRAHAM HUDSON*
This article uses constitutional discourses on the legality of security certificates to shed
light on darker, neglected corners of the security and migration nexus in Canada. I explore
how procedures and practices used in the certificate regime have evolved and migrated to
analogous adjudicative and discretionary decision-making contexts. I argue, on the one hand,
that the executive’s ability to label persons security risks has been subjected to meaningful
constraints in the certificate regime and other functionally equivalent adjudicative proceedings.
On the other hand, the ability of discretionary decision makers to deport individuals who pose
de jure security risks to face torture or similar abuses remains effectively unconstrained—so
much so that it is doubtful that Canada has complied with Suresh. If the Supreme Court of
Canada takes its own rationale in the certificate trilogy seriously, it must either revise its
position in Suresh or encourage the extension of the procedures and practices used in the
certificate regime to the entire security and migration nexus, including the removal process.
Cet article fait appel au discours constitutionnel sur la légitimité des certificats de sécurité
pour mettre en lumière des aspects plus sombres et souvent négligés des liens entre la
sécurité et l’immigration au Canada. J’analyse la manière dont ont évolué les procédures
et les pratiques employées dans le régime des certificats, qui ont migré vers des contextes
décisionnels judiciaire et discrétionnaire analogues. Je prétends que, d’une part, la
possibilité pour le pouvoir exécutif de cataloguer une personne comme danger pour la
sécurité a été assujettie à des contraintes significatives dans le régime des certificats et
autres mesures judiciaires ayant la même fonction. Par contre, la possibilité de déporter de
manière discrétionnaire des personnes qui représentent en droit un danger pour la sécurité
au risque de les exposer à la torture ou à d’autres abus semblables demeure effectivement
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libre de contraintes – à tel point qu’il est douteux que le Canada ait respecté les droits de
l’accusé dans l’affaire Suresh. Si la Cour suprême du Canada prend au sérieux son propre
raisonnement relativement à la trilogie des certificats, elle doit soit réviser sa position face
à l’affaire Suresh, soit prôner la poursuite des procédures et des pratiques employées dans
le régime des certificats jusqu’au bout du lien entre la sécurité et l’immigration, y compris le
processus de déportation.
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FEW ELEMENTS OF CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS have received

as much legal, popular, or scholarly attention as security certificates.1 Although
1.

For a small sampling of literature, see Colleen Bell, “Subject to Exception: Security
Certificates, National Security and Canada’s Role in the ‘War on Terror’” (2006) 21:1 CJLS
63 [Bell, “Subject to Exception”]; Canadian Bar Association, “Submission on Bill C-3
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act amendments (Certificate and Special Advocates)”
(November 2007), online: <www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/07-59-eng.pdf>; Canadian
Council for Refugees, “Security certificates: Next Steps” (6 June 2007), online: <ccrweb.ca/
sites/ccrweb.ca/files/certificates07.pdf>; Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, Seeking Justice in
an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of
‘Special Advocates’ in National Security Proceedings (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Faculty of
Law, 2007); Joanne Mariner, “Canada: Parliament Should Amend Bill on Special Advocates”
(19 November 2007), online: Human Rights Watch <www.hrw.org/news/2007/11/18/
canada-parliament-should-amend-bill-special-advocates>; John Ip, “The Rise and Spread
of the Special Advocate” (2008) PL 717; International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group,
“Submission of Information by the ICLMG to the Committee Against Torture (CAT) for
the Examination of Canada’s 6th Report in May 2012” (16 April 2012), online: <iclmg.ca/
wp-content/uploads/sites/37/2014/03/BR-CAT-Canadas-6th-report.pdf>; David Jenkins,
“There and Back Again: The Strange Journey of Special Advocates and Comparative
Law Methodology” (2011) 42:2 Colum HRL Rev 279; Kent Roach, “When Secret
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in existence since 1978, security certificates have become a symbol of the heavy
human rights costs associated with contemporary counter-terrorism law, policy,
and practices. The reasons are easy to understand. Certificates are based largely
on secret evidence, allow the indefinite detention of non-citizens alleged to
threaten Canada’s security, facilitate the removal of persons to face the substantial
risk of persecution, torture, or similar abuses, and arguably discriminate on the
basis of citizenship.2 The certificate regime also rests on a broader assemblage of
security-based policies and practices associated with several high-profile human
rights abuses, including those perpetrated against Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki,
and Ahmad El Maati.3
Certificates have for these reasons been described as “exceptional.”4 A contested
term, exceptionality may be defined simply as that which is rarely or infrequently
used. This is a misleading definition: While certificates per se are infrequently
used, security-based detentions and deportations have occurred rather regularly
since the early 1990s through more ordinary measures, while the use of secret

2.
3.

4.

Intelligence Becomes Evidence: Some Implications of Khadr and Charkaoui II” (2009) 47
Sup Ct L Rev 147
Similar provisions in UK legislation were found to be inconsistent with the European
Convention of Human Rights. See A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 [A and Others, 2004].
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) [Arar Inquiry]; The Honourable Frank
Iacobucci, Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah
Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nurredin: Supplement to Public Report (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2010).
Bell, “Subject to Exception,” supra note 1; Colleen Bell, The Freedom of Security: Governing
Canada in the Age of Counter-Terrorism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), ch 2; Irina
Ceric, “The Sovereign Charter: Security, Territory and the Boundaries of Constitutional
Rights” (2012) 44:1 Ottawa L Rev 353; Mike Larsen & Justin Piché, “Incarcerating the
‘Inadmissible’: KIHC as an Exceptional Moment in Canadian Federal Imprisonment”
(May 2007) [unpublished, archived at York University, York Centre for International and
Security Studies]; Kent Roach, “The Law Working Itself Pure? The Canadian Experience
with Exceptional Courts and Guantánamo” in Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Oren Gross, eds,
Guantánamo and Beyond: Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in Comparative
Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 201.
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evidence in the context of these and related practices is commonplace.5 Indeed,
successive governments have steadily “securitized” the entire immigration and
refugee law system, employing such practices as enhanced surveillance and
screening of migrants,6 arbitrary detentions, expedited removals, limitations on
the procedural and substantive rights of asylum seekers, and greater information
sharing or institutional cooperation at the domestic and international levels.7 In
combination with recent legislative reforms,8 these practices support a range of
adjudicative and discretionary decision-making processes that operate outside of
the context of certificates.9
We may instead adopt a constitutional definition of exceptionality, one
that refers to measures and practices that do not (self-evidently) cohere with

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

These measures include admissibility hearings, refugee claim hearings, detention reviews,
as well as a host of supplemental preventive and deterrent measures that include revocation
of passports and the removal of the citizenship of so-called “foreign fighters” (when such
fighters have dual citizenship). I will outline the similarities between these proceedings and
certificates in Part III of this article, below. In the meantime, see Jo Anne Colson, Canadian
Refugee Policy: the Politics of the Frame (PhD Thesis, Trent University, 2013) [unpublished] at
132-40; Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order
(New York: Routledge, 2011) at 20; Sharryn J Aiken, “National Security and Canadian
Immigration: Deconstructing the Discourse of Trade-Offs” in Francois Crépeau, ed, Les
migrations internationales contemporaines: Une dynamique complexe au cœur de la globalisation
(Montreal: Presses de L’Université de Montréal, 2009) 172; Sharryn J Aiken, “Of Gods
and Monsters: National Security and Canadian Refugee Policy” (2001) 14:1 RQDI 7 at 19
[Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters”].
Deborah Waller Meyers, “Does ‘Smarter’ Lead to Safer? An Assessment of the US Border
Accords with Canada and Mexico” (2003) 41:4 Int’l Migr 5; H Richard Friman, “Migration
and Security: Crime, Terror, and the Politics of Order” in Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia &
Simon Reich, eds, Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative
Perspective (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008) 130.
Graham Hudson, “Transnational Human Rights Advocacy and the Judicial Review of Global
Intelligence Agency Cooperation in Canada” in Craig Forcese & François Crépeau, eds,
Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years After 9/11 (Montreal: Canadian Institute for the
Administration of Justice, 2011) 175; Alexander Moens, “The Challenging Parameters of
the Border Action Plan” in Seminar Proceedings: Perimeter Security and the Beyond the Border
Dialogue: Perspectives from the PNW-Western Canada Region (Bellingham, Wash: Border
Policy Research Institute, 2011) 15.
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17; Balanced Refugee Reform
Act, SC 2010, c 8.
Examples include admissibility hearings, detention reviews, and decisions to deport in the
context of persecution, torture, extra-judicial killings, and similar human rights abuses. I will
provide a more detailed description of these various decision-making processes in Part III of
the article, below.

HUDSON, AS GOOD AS IT GETS? 909

constitutional principles or autonomous legal values such as the rule of law.10 The
difficulty with this understanding of exceptionality is that reasonable people can
disagree about what the law allows. In three recent cases—Charkaoui v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration)11 in 2007, Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration)12 in 2008, and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Harkat13 in
2014 (the “certificate trilogy”)—the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) decided
that the pernicious qualities of certificates are more or less manageable so long
as courts, Parliament, and other legal actors are vigilant in operationalizing core
constitutional principles. In Charkaoui I and Charkaoui II, the Court decided
that elements of the certificate regime were unconstitutional but could be saved
if Parliament addressed deficiencies in disclosure and adversarial challenge. In
Harkat, the Court reviewed Parliament’s response to the Charkaoui judgments,
finding that the current regime passes constitutional muster. It also upheld the
reasonableness of the certificate issued against Mr. Harkat, paving the way for his
removal from Canada.14 Mr. Harkat was the first of five alleged terrorists named
in certificates since September 11 (“9/11”) to be subject to removal.
The possible removal of Mr. Harkat highlights a third, doctrinal definition
of exceptionality. In the 2002 case of Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration),15 the SCC ruled that Canada is generally prohibited from
deporting persons to a place where they face a substantial risk of torture.
Derogating from Canada’s international obligations,16 the Court went on to say
that deportation to torture may be justified under “exceptional circumstances.”17
10. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005); David Dyzenhaus, “The State of Emergency in Legal Theory” in
Victor V Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach, eds, Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 65; Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules:
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?” (2003) 112:5 Yale LJ 1011;
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, “The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency
Powers” (2004) 2:2 Int’l J Const L 210; Colin McQuillan, “The Real State of Emergency:
Agamben on Benjamin and Schmitt” (2010) 18 Stud Soc & Pol Thought 96; Walter
Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” translated by Edmund Jephcott et al in Howard
Eiland & Michael W Jennings, eds, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4: 1938-1940
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) 389.
11. 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350 [Charkaoui I].
12. 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 SCR 326 [Charkaoui II].
13. 2014 SCC 37, [2014] 2 SCR 33 [Harkat].
14. Re Harkat, 2010 FC 1241, [2012] 3 FCR 251 [Harkat, (9 December 2010)].
15. 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3 [Suresh].
16. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Can TS 1987 No 36.
17. Suresh, supra note 15 at para 78.
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The Court did not clarify what counts as an exceptional circumstance. Given that
Mr. Harkat claims that he would be subject to torture or similar abuse if returned
to Algeria,18 the precise ambits (and legality) of this zone of exceptionality are
critical. Amidst revelations concerning Canada’s complicity in torture as well as
extensive normative developments,19 the Court may soon have occasion to revisit
Suresh, much as it did with respect to extradition to face the death penalty.20
The purpose of this article is to use constitutional discourses on the
legality of security certificates to shed light on darker, neglected corners of the
security-migration nexus, with special regard to deportation to torture. I argue
that the certificate trilogy and Suresh rest on the same cardinal principle: Decisions
that expose asylum seekers to serious human rights abuses or a substantial
risk thereof must be constrained by enhanced procedural protections such as
disclosure, adversarial challenge, and judicial review. On the one hand, courts
have internalized this principle in the context of certificates and functionally
equivalent proceedings, which is to say that they have imposed meaningful (albeit
imperfect) constraints on the ability of the executive to label persons security
risks. On the other hand, the ability of decision makers to subsequently deport
such people to face torture or similar abuses remains effectively unconstrained—
so much so that it is doubtful that Canada has complied with Suresh. If the SCC
takes its own rationale in the certificate trilogy seriously, it must either revise its
position in Suresh or encourage the extension of the procedures and practices
used in the certificate regime to the entire security-migration nexus, including
the removal process.
The article is divided into four parts. First, I review the shifting legislative and
constitutional landscape within which security certificates operate, highlighting
core principles elucidated in Charkaoui I and Charkaoui II. This includes reference
to recent legislative changes ushered in by the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.21 Second,
I use Harkat as a base for appraising how Parliament and the Federal Court have
attempted to operationalize the constitutional principles outlined in Charkaoui
I and Charkaoui II. I focus in particular on how the SCC has placed the bulk
of responsibility for guarding the rule of law on the shoulders of Federal Court
judges. I argue that its trust in the Federal Court’s ability (and willingness) to
18. Sean Kilpatrick, “Mohamed Harkat says he’ll need a casket if deported to
Algeria,” CTV News (15 May 2014), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/canada/
mohamed-harkat-says-he-ll-need-a-casket-if-deported-to-algeria-1.1823216>.
19. I will detail these factual and normative developments below.
20. United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283.
21. SC 2015, c 20 [Bill C-51].
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discharge this role is the primary condition under which it tolerates legislative
language and executive practices that continue to provide for the possibility of
grave injustice and human rights abuses. Third, I reflect on how the position of
the Court in the certificate trilogy obligates it to take notice of non-compliance
with Suresh. I argue that certain procedural protections used in the certificate
regime should be used to improve the quality and fairness of decision making
about the deportation of individuals who pose security risks in contexts where
there is a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse.

I. THE CONSTITUTION OF SECURITY CERTIFICATES
A. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

In existence since 1978, security certificates are a long-standing component
of immigration and refugee law. Governed under Division 9 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act,22 certificate proceedings begin when the Ministers of
Public Safety Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada issue a certificate
against a non-citizen who they allege is inadmissible to Canada on the grounds
of security, violation of human or international rights, serious criminality, or
organized criminality.23 The bulk of evidence used to support this allegation
is provided by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”), although
the Ministers may also rely on information provided by the Canadian Border
Services Agency (“CBSA”), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”), or
Communications Security Establishment. This evidence is collected through
domestic operations as well as through formal and informal partnerships with
foreign intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.24

22. SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
23. Ibid, s 77(1).
24. For an overview of how security intelligence is gathered and shared, see Hudson, supra
note 7; Adam DM Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison
and International Relations” (2009) 24:5 Intelligence & Nat’l Sec 700; Martin Rudner,
“Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism” (2004)
17:2 Int’l J Intelligence & Counterintelligence 193; Glen M Segell, “Intelligence Agency
Relations Between the European Union and the U.S.” (2004) 17:1 Int’l J Intelligence &
Counterintelligence 81; Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International
Intelligence Cooperation” (2003) 16:4 Int’l J Intelligence & Counterintelligence 527; Derek
S Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror” (2006) 50:3
Orbis 453; Richard J Aldrich, “Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence”
(2009) 35:4 Rev Int’l Stud 889.
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Once the Ministers believe they have reasonable grounds to suspect that a
non-citizen poses a security risk, they will issue a certificate and a warrant for
the arrest of the named person. A Federal Court judge (the “designated judge”)
will review the reasons for the detention and the reasonableness of the certificate
itself. The judge must order the continuation of the detention if the release of
the named person would be injurious to national security, endanger the safety of
any person, or enhance the risk of flight. Detention reviews occur within the first
forty-eight hours after a detention begins and at six-month intervals thereafter, at
least until the reasonableness of the certificate has been determined.25
Until recently, the IRPA required the Ministers to provide the designated
judge with all relevant information and other evidence upon which the certificate
is based.26 As part of the suite of amendments introduced through the recently
enacted Bill C-51, the scope of this disclosure will be reduced to evidence that
is “relevant to the ground of inadmissibility stated in the certificate.”27 The
Ministers must then prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they had reasonable
grounds to issue the certificate.28 If the designated judge finds that a certificate is
reasonable, the person is inadmissible and subject to removal from Canada. The
designated judge is authorized to make decisions on the basis of evidence not
disclosed to the named person.29
Provisions in Division 9 of the IRPA govern the general framework for
proceedings. Section 83 specifies the procedures by which information is to be
protected, directing designated judges to: proceed as informally and expeditiously
as the circumstances and considerations of fairness and natural justice permit;
receive into evidence, and base a decision on, anything that they consider to be
reliable and appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court of law; and ensure
the confidentiality of information and other evidence provided by the Minister
if, in the judge’s opinion, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or
endanger the safety of any person.30 At the initiative of the Ministers, the latter
determination is made during the course of a closed hearing.

25.
26.
27.
28.

IRPA, supra note 22, s 82.
Ibid, s 77(2).
Supra note 21, s 72(2), amending IRPA, supra note 22, ss 77(2)-(3).
IRPA, supra note 22, s 78; Ahani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(2000), 184 FTR 320 at para 16, 77 CRR (2d) 144 (FCA); Almrei v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship), 2004 FC 420 at paras 34-35, [2004] 4 FCR 327.
29. IRPA, supra note 22, s 83(1)(i).
30. Ibid, s 83(1).
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According to the IRPA, named persons are entitled to the disclosure of such
evidence as is necessary to be “reasonably informed” of the case against them.31
Disclosed evidence comes in the form of a public Security Intelligence Report
(“SIR”), “source matrices,” and summaries of closed evidence prepared by the
Minister.32 The named person and his or her counsel are allowed to call witnesses
and to cross-examine those government witnesses who testify during open
hearings. The IRPA directs designated judges to maintain the confidentiality
of information, the disclosure of which would adversely affect national
security (including the integrity of national security operations, strategies, and
relationships) or the safety of individual persons including intelligence officers,
operatives, and human sources. Closed hearings are attended by the designated
judge, Ministers, “special advocates” (“SAs”), and a court worker. Each of these
parties has access to secret SIRs, which include the history, results, and progress
of ongoing or stalled intelligence operations.
Due to Bill C-51, not all of this information will be filed with the Federal
Court; only information that is relevant to the ground of admissibility outlined
in the certificate will be filed. SAs may request the disclosure of information in
the possession of the government that has not been filed.33 This procedure enables
SAs to access exculpatory evidence, challenge the reliability of submitted evidence
or the reasonableness of the government’s position, or identify whether evidence
may have been derived from torture. Bill C-51 allows the Ministers to challenge
further disclosure, on the grounds that requested information does not enable the
named person to be reasonably informed of the case against him or her.34 This
supposes, wrongly, that the right to be reasonably informed suffices to enable
named persons to adequately defend themselves. As we will see when I review
Harkat, the adequacy of the SA regime is a separate matter from the right of
named persons to be reasonably informed; both are necessary for a trial to be fair.
31. Ibid, s 83.
32. Since 2005, the Federal Court has required that source matrices include information that
places intelligence in context, including the origin and the length of the relationship between
CSIS and a human source or foreign intelligence service; whether there are reasons to believe
the information or intelligence was provided for self-gain; whether a human source has a
prior criminal record or is under investigation by a law-enforcement or security intelligence
agency; the extent to which information or intelligence has been, or is, corroborated by
other evidence or information; whether the information or intelligence was acquired through
torture or grave human rights abuse; and the accuracy of any document that records or
summarizes intercepted information. See Re Harkat, 2005 FC 393 at paras 94-96, [2006] 1
FCR D-5 [Harkat, (22 March 2005)].
33. Bill C-51, supra note 21, ss 54, 57(1) amending IRPA, supra note 22, ss 77(2)-(3), 83(1)(c.2).
34. Ibid.
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B. CHARKAOUI I

Prior to Harkat, the SCC twice reviewed elements of the certificate regime for
consistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 (“Charter”).35
In Charkaoui I, it invalidated certain provisions in the IRPA governing the
protection of information. A primary issue was the constitutionality of the use
of closed evidence. At the time, the impugned provisions required that such
evidence be tendered during closed hearings attended by only the designated
judge and the Ministers—there were no SAs. The court found that the
absence of counsel representing the interests of named persons during closed
proceedings contravened the section 7 Charter right to a fair trial. Importantly,
this decision rested on the observation that certificates lead to three actual or
potential substantive harms: protracted detention, deportation to torture, and
harm to dignity.36
The cardinal principle in Charkaoui I—and the certificate trilogy as a
whole—is that proceedings that lead to (the risk of ) serious deprivations of life,
liberty, or security of the person require enhanced procedural protections. It does
not matter whether the proceedings are criminal or administrative in nature;
what matters is the impact the decision has on the well-being of the affected
person. While certificate proceedings are administrative in nature, the Court
accordingly relied on criminal law principles to resolve the question of whether
named persons were receiving a fair trial, which consists of three conditions.
First, the named person must know and be able to respond to the Minister’s
allegations. This requires that the named person receive a certain but unspecified
amount of direct disclosure. Second, the designated judge must base his or her
decision on both the facts and the law. This condition could be satisfied by the
presence of opposing counsel during secret trials (i.e., adversarial challenge),
who may challenge the reliability and sufficiency of secret evidence as well as
the strength of the Minister’s arguments. Third, the designated judge must be
independent and impartial.37
35. It upheld the constitutionality of pre-9/11 certificate legislation. See Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 SCR 711, 90 DLR (4th) 289.
36. Charkaoui I, supra note 11 at paras 12-18. The Court did not use the term “dignity” directly.
It stated that a “certificate may bring with it the accusation that one is a terrorist, which
could cause irreparable harm to the individual,” adding later that this includes—and thus
is not limited to—deportation to torture (ibid at para 14). The Court was aware of the
2004 judgment of the UK House of Lords that similar provisions in the United Kingdom
were discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 of the European Conventions on
Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights. See A and Others, 2004, supra note 2.
37. Charkaoui I, supra note 11 at paras 28-31.
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The Court ruled that the first two conditions were sorely lacking. The Court
pointed to several alternative approaches to the use of secret evidence in legal
proceedings, thereby giving the government an opportunity to save the certificate
regime. Prior to the introduction of the IRPA, for example, the reasonableness
of certificates was reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee
(“SIRC”)—an independent body tasked with the review of CSIS activities.38
SIRC was assisted by security-cleared counsel who, among other things, advanced
the interests of a complainant. While not an advocate per se, SIRC counsel had
access to closed evidence and could cross-examine government witnesses during
closed hearings. Similar approaches were used during the Arar Inquiry.39 The
Court also took notice of the fact that the United Kingdom has employed a
SIRC-style SA model since 1997.40 Notwithstanding some notable weaknesses,
including under-resourcing of SAs and statutory bars to communication between
SAs and affected persons, this system was certainly superior to the IRPA system
then under review. The Court left it for Parliament to decide how to bring the
certificate regime into conformity with the Charter.
Parliament shortly thereafter amended the IRPA, empowering SAs to attend
closed hearings in order to challenge the Ministers’ claims that certain information
cannot be disclosed for reasons of national security or personal safety and to
challenge the relevance, reliability, and sufficiency of secret evidence.41 Section
85.2 of the IRPA specifies that SAs may make oral and written communication
with respect to classified information.42 SAs may also participate in, and
cross-examine witnesses who testify during closed hearings.43
Designated judges have been required to interpret and apply these provisions
in light of Charkaoui I. Over time, a series of questions has recurred, including:
(a) May SAs have access to all information on file with the government that
is relevant to a named person, or only evidence submitted by the Ministers;
(b) Under what circumstances might procedural fairness justify the disclosure
of privileged material, such as the employment records of CSIS agents or the
identities of confidential informants;44 (c) May SAs cross-examine CSIS human
sources (whose identities would normally be kept confidential) in order to
38. Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National
Security with Procedural Fairness” (1990) 3 Can J Admin L & Prac 173.
39. Hudson, supra note 7 at 33.
40. Charkaoui I, supra note 11 at paras 80-84.
41. IRPA, supra note 22, s 85.1(2).
42. Ibid, s 85.2(a).
43. Ibid, s 85.2(b).
44. Re Harkat, 2009 FC 203, [2009] 3 FCR D-10.
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challenge the reliability of evidence; (d) To what extent may SAs communicate
with named persons, or other SAs, about a case after having seen classified
material; (e) To what extent are communications between SAs and named persons
covered by solicitor–client privilege; and (f ) Do named persons have a right to
direct disclosure, regardless of what is disclosed to SAs?
Foreseeing some of these issues, Parliament provided designated judges with
broad discretion over procedural matters relating to SAs. For instance, section
85.6 of the IRPA authorizes the chief justices of the Federal Court of Appeal
and the Federal Court, along with a committee of their choosing, to make rules
governing the practices and procedures relating to SAs.45 Designated judges, of
which there are typically between eight and ten, receive training in handling secret
evidence and presiding over secret trials and regularly confer with one another
about lessons learned and best practices. Section 85.2(c) directs designated judges
to authorize “any other powers that are necessary to protect the interests of the
permanent resident or foreign national.”46 Section 85.5 allows judges to waive
prohibitions on communication between SAs and named persons.47 Finally,
Parliament provided named persons with a right of appeal to the Federal Court
of Appeal for serious questions of general importance, excluding interlocutory
decisions.48 These legislative provisions and the institutional culture of the Federal
Court have helped ensure consistent practices among designated judges.
C. CHARKAOUI II

Shortly following the 2008 amendment of the IRPA, the Court turned its attention
to the outer limits of the certificate regime: the assemblage of security intelligence
practices that produce evidence used against named persons. In Charkaoui II,
the Court again analogized the certificate regime to criminal proceedings, this
time noting that functional distinctions between security intelligence and law
enforcement have been blurred post-9/11 and that certificate-based deportations
can lead to arrest and prosecution abroad.49 The Court decided that CSIS, and
any other domestic institution providing the Ministers with security intelligence
and other information, is subject to criminal law principles relating to the
retention and disclosure of evidence. Operationally, this means that CSIS must
retain and disclose to the Ministers all information on file regarding a named
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Supra note 22, s 85.6.
Ibid, s 85.2(c).
Ibid, s 85.5.
Ibid, s 82(3).
Supra note 12 at paras 26-28, 50-55.
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person, whether it is inculpatory or exculpatory.50 The Ministers, in turn, are
responsible for ensuring that all of this information is disclosed to the designated
judge and SAs. In consideration of the position of the Minister and SAs, the
judge then determines what material may be disclosed to the named person and
what material must remain classified.
Charkaoui II provided considerable guidance to designated judges with respect
to questions of disclosure, but some old questions remained and new questions
quickly emerged, including: (a) What is the exact scope of CSIS’s obligation to
disclose; (b) Must it disclose all information that is minimally relevant or only
information that is reasonably necessary in order for the SAs to test the accuracy
of submitted evidence;51 (c) Does Charkaoui II disclosure include information
that may be privileged, such as the identities of human sources; (d) If CSIS’s
confidential informants do enjoy privilege, under what conditions (if any) may
it be lifted; (e) If there is no privilege, or if it is lifted, should SAs also be able to
cross-examine human sources; (f ) How might Charkaoui II affect the fairness of
proceedings that were already underway, given that large volumes of information
that should have been disclosed in principle were already destroyed in accordance
with long-standing internal policy; and (g) Are named persons entitled to receive
a certain amount of direct disclosure? As adequate as the SA system may be, it
does not completely satisfy the free-standing section 7 right of a named person to
know and respond to the case against him or her.
D. SUMMARY

In sum, Parliament’s intent that certificate proceedings be carried out “as informally
and expeditiously as possible”52 has not been realized. To the contrary, they
have proven to be exceedingly complex, time consuming, and administratively
burdensome. The internal operations of public and closed proceedings and
the issue of the stream within which certain information belongs have been
subject to frequent interlocutory hearings, appeals, and Charter challenges.
Charter challenges have in two instances yielded landmark SCC rulings,53 but
there remained a plethora of questions about how the Federal Court was to
operationalize abstract principles. Parliament’s decision to allow the Federal
Court and Federal Court of Appeal to produce rules and resolve questions of
procedure has facilitated a measure of consistency. Designated judges frequently
50.
51.
52.
53.

Ibid at para 2.
Harkat, (22 March 2005), supra note 32 at para 12.
IRPA, supra note 22, s 83(1)(a).
Charkaoui I, supra note 11; Charkaoui II, supra note 12.
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confer with each other, receive direction from the chief justices of the Federal
Court and Federal Court of Appeal, and regularly cite each other’s decisions.
Consistency is also supported by the availability of appeals on questions of law,
both to the Federal Court of Appeal and ultimately to the SCC. Still, the normal
operations and institutional capacities of the Federal Court have been strained by
the need for judges to manage large volumes of factual information across public
and closed hearings while building and maintaining a body of jurisprudence in
the context of a shifting constitutional and legislative landscape.

II. HARKAT V CANADA
Harkat is the most recent SCC case dealing with the constitutionality of the
certificate regime. The case was triggered by a 2010 finding by a designated judge
that the certificate issued against Mr. Harkat was reasonable.54 Facing removal
from Canada, Mr. Harkat’s only chance of having the certificate against him
quashed was to persuade the SCC that the post-Charkaoui I legislative framework
for certificates remained unconstitutional or that the proceedings against him
were conducted in an unfair manner.
A. A SECOND LOOK AT CERTIFICATE LEGISLATION

The first set of issues concerned whether Parliament fully incorporated the
elements of a fair trial into Division 9 of the IRPA. There was a host of sub-issues
at play here, including: (a) whether named persons receive enough information
to be reasonably informed of the case against them; (b) whether SAs possess
the powers and resources necessary to discharge their roles; and (c) whether the
Charter allows for hearsay to be used as evidence.
As noted, the Court in Charkaoui I stated that a fair trial consists of three
distinct but interrelated elements: the right to know and to respond to the
Minister’s allegations; the right to have decisions made on the basis of the facts
and law; and the right to have decisions made by an independent and impartial
adjudicator. The Court found that a certificate proceeding will always be unfair
if (a) the named person is provided access only to general assertions (in violation
of the right to know and respond to the case) and; (b) there is an absence of
adversarial challenge (in violation of the right to a decision based on the facts
and law). As we saw, the Court dealt with these issues by recommending the
introduction of an SA system. But the Court did not squarely address the
54. Harkat, supra note 13 at paras 107-09.
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question of whether the section 7 right of named persons to know and meet the
case against them requires a certain degree of direct disclosure, regardless of what
may be disclosed to an SA.
There are some analogues for determining the scope of direct disclosure.
In a criminal trial, for example, an accused is entitled to receive any and all
information in the possession of the Crown that is relevant to his or her defence
and that is not subject to a limited class of privilege. The accused is always entitled
to information that is submitted as evidence. Even here, there may be conflicts
between disclosure and national security. These conflicts are governed by section
38 of the Canada Evidence Act,55 which authorizes judges to order the disclosure
of sensitive information if the public interest in doing so outweighs the public
interest in non-disclosure.56 When this happens in the context of a criminal trial,
the Crown may respond by withdrawing the contested information as evidence.
This means that information that is not disclosed to an accused may not, under
any circumstances, be submitted as evidence in a criminal trial. In the event that
the non-disclosure of evidence unduly limits the capacity of the accused to make
full answer and defence, a judge may provide certain remedies, including a stay
of proceedings.
The Court has consistently found that this model is inappropriate for
certificates because requiring that evidence either be disclosed to a named
person or withdrawn undermines the entire purpose of the certificate regime.57
While the Court has applied criminal law principles to certificate proceedings,
it was reluctant to find that the use of secret evidence during administrative
proceedings is unconstitutional per se. The real question was the extent of direct
disclosure required or, put negatively, the extent of submitted evidence that may
be withheld constitutionally from the named person. The Court decided that
named persons are entitled to receive what it called an “incompressible minimum
amount of disclosure,” in the absence of which proceedings will be deemed

55. RSC 1985, c C-5.
56. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 69.
57. Ibid at para 50; Charkaoui I, supra note 11 at para 77.
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unfair.58 Designated judges must determine whether there has been a sufficient
degree of direct disclosure on a case-by-case basis. In the event that a judge directs
disclosure of material that the Minister resolutely wishes to keep classified, “the
Minister must withdraw the information or evidence whose non-disclosure
prevents the named person from being reasonably informed.”59 Incidentally,
Bill C-51 provides the Minister with the exclusive right to appeal decisions on
disclosure—the exercise of which suspends the disclosure order until the matter
has been settled by the Federal Court of Appeal.60
The Court then addressed the tendency of the government to over-claim
national security confidentiality. This issue has been a subject of judicial concern,
both within the context of security certificates61 and beyond.62 It should be
noted that over-claiming of confidentiality is often not driven by disregard for
the Charter; it is more frequently a function of novel and complex relationships
between government lawyers and members of the intelligence community and an
understandable concern on the part of the former to err on the side of over-claiming
rather than divulging highly sensitive information. Nonetheless, the Court took
occasion to direct designated judges to “be vigilant and skeptical with respect to
the Minister’s claims of confidentiality.”63 Recognizing the exceptional nature of
security certificates and its place at the outer limits of constitutionality, the Court
concluded that over-claiming threatens the integrity of the certificate regime’s
“fragile equilibrium” and that “systematic over-claiming would infringe the
58. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 55. This aspect of the judgment was informed by the 2009
case of A and Others v the United Kingdom decided by the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”). The ECHR decided that a trial would be unfair where disclosed material consists
“purely” of general assertions and a decision is “based solely or to a decisive degree on closed
material.” See A and Others v the United Kingdom [GC], No 3455/05, [2009] ECHR 301
at para 220, 49 EHRR 29. See also Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF, [2009]
UKHL 28 at para 51, [2010] 2 AC 269; Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB,
[2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440.
59. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 59. Just such a scenario occurred in the 2009 Federal
Court case of Re Charkaoui. Justice Trembley-Lamer ordered the disclosure of evidence
notwithstanding the Minister’s ardent position that this would result in injury to national
security. The Minister chose to withdraw the evidence, which resulted in the quashing of
the certificate against Mr. Charkaoui. See Re Charkaoui, 2009 FC 1030, [2010] 4 FCR 448
[Re Charkaoui].
60. Supra note 21.
61. Re Almrei, 2009 FC 1263, [2011] 1 FCR 163 [Almrei, (14 December 2009)].
62. Canada (Attorney General) v Almalki, 2010 FC 1106 at para 108, [2012] 2 FCR 508; Khadr
v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 549 at paras 73-77, 98, 329 FTR 80; Arar Inquiry,
supra note 3 at 302.
63. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 63.
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named person’s right to a fair process or undermine the integrity of the judicial
system, requiring a remedy under s[ection] 24(1) of the Charter.”64
With these issues out of the way, the Court turned its attention to the
adequacy of the SA system. As noted, SAs are prohibited from communicating
with named persons after accessing classified material. This provision impedes
effective advocacy, as communication helps SAs receive meaningful instruction
and information from affected persons, use knowledge about personal history
and relationships to challenge the reliability or sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence, prepare the named person to testify, and more effectively cross-examine
the Ministers’ witnesses.65 In addition to improving legal representation, the
freer, two-way flow of information between SAs and named persons (and their
counsel) would concomitantly improve the ability of designated judges to make
decisions on the basis of law and the facts.
The constitutionality of the IRPA on this point was saved by section 85.4(2),
which authorizes designated judges to allow communication on a case-by-case
basis. It turns out that designated judges have adopted the practice of authorizing
communication “in most cases.”66 The Court explicitly directed designated judges
to continue this practice and to “take a liberal approach” to communication
requests, refusing authorization only “where the Minister has demonstrated, on
a balance of probabilities, a real—as opposed to a speculative—risk of injurious
disclosure.”67 It also noted that SAs may receive an “unlimited amount of
one-way communication” from named persons, the utility of which is enhanced
by the provision of fulsome summaries, public SIRs, and now the guarantee of a
minimum core of disclosure.68
A practical difficulty arises, though, as SAs may receive such permission
only after submitting a formal request during interlocutory hearings attended
by the Ministers. To support the request, an SA may need to divulge to the
Ministers prior communications and litigation strategies, which can obviously
prejudice the named person and breach the solicitor-client privilege that attaches
to communications between the SA and the named person. In addition to being

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Ibid at para 64.
Forcese & Waldman, supra note 1 at 35-38.
Re Harkat, 2010 FC 1242 at para 139, [2012] 3 FCR 432.
Harkat, supra note 13 at para 70.
Ibid at para 71.
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powerfully protected at common law and constitutional law,69 solicitor-client
privilege is expressly protected under section 85.1(4) of the IRPA. The Court
decided that this potential unfairness may be averted if designated judges employ
safeguards, such as hearing an SA’s submissions in the absence of the Ministers.70
A final issue relates to hearsay. This is an issue of general importance because
evidence derived from security intelligence work often contains appreciable levels
of hearsay. Hearsay is ordinarily inadmissible as evidence in large part due to
questions of reliability.71 Recall that the IRPA allows designated judges to receive
into evidence anything they consider to be reliable and appropriate, even if
inadmissible in a court of law.72 The Court upheld the constitutionality of this
provision on the grounds that the IRPA empowers designated judges to exclude
evidence that they find to be unreliable or that excessively prejudices a named
person.73 This exclusionary power allows judges to protect against unfairness
while accommodating the realities of security intelligence work.
B. WERE THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MR. HARKAT FAIR?

The next cluster of issues concerned whether proceedings against Mr. Harkat
cohered with the principles outlined in Charkaoui II. This segment of the
judgment dealt with the extent to which criminal law principles should govern
certificate proceedings. For example, Mr. Harkat argued that his SAs should
have the authority to cross-examine or at least learn the identities of CSIS
human sources. The government responded that these sources are protected
by “informer privilege,” which is ordinarily used to withhold the identities of
police informants. It is a cardinal rule in criminal law that the identities of police
informants are privileged, meaning that they cannot be divulged to the defence
or to the public.74 This obviously means that informers cannot be cross-examined.
The rationale for informer privilege is twofold: to protect the informer and, in
69. Smith v Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455, 169 DLR (4th) 385; R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151,
[1990] 5 WWR 1; R v Jones, [1994] 2 SCR 229 at 246-55, 114 DLR (4th) 645; Re Shell
Canada Ltd, [1975] FC 184, 55 DLR (3d) 713; Solosky v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 821,
105 DLR (3d) 745.
70. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 72; Re Almrei, 2008 FC 1216 at paras 60-61,
[2009] 3 FCR 497.
71. David M Tanovich, “Starr Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada” (2003)
28:2 Queen’s LJ 371.
72. This allows for the admission of evidence if a judge is “satisfied that the information is
reliable and appropriate,” even though “under traditional rules of evidence it would be
inadmissible as hearsay.” See Re Jaballah, 2010 FC 224 at para 62, [2011] 3 FCR 155.
73. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 76.
74. R v Leipert, [1997] 1 SCR 281, 143 DLR (4th) 38.
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so doing, to encourage others to come forward with important information.75
The non-disclosure of information pertaining to informers runs counter to
the principle of full disclosure. However, informer privilege has acquired
constitutional status, such that the identity of the informer will be divulged if
and only if it is necessary to demonstrate the innocence of the accused.76
When the Harkat case was before the Federal Court, Justice Noël, the
designated judge, held that CSIS human sources are protected by privilege.
Consistent with the logic of Charkaoui II, Justice Noël reasoned that such
sources are functionally equivalent to police informers and that utmost secrecy
is essential to effective intelligence work.77 It is standard practice, for example, to
“compartmentalize” information pertaining to the identities of human sources,
such that only those who “need to know” such information in order to fulfill
an operational requirement are provided with access.78 Failure to maintain the
confidentiality of informer identities would result in the breakdown of shortand long-term relationships that are among the primary means through which
CSIS acquires intelligence and other information.79 Justice Noël held that the
only circumstance under which SAs would be granted access to such information
would be to “prevent a flagrant breach of procedural justice which would bring
the administration of justice into disrepute.”80
The question of privilege was practically important in the context of Harkat
because of a series of revelations concerning ministerial malfeasance. Since
2005, the Federal Court has required the Ministers to disclose to the court all
relevant information regarding the credibility and reliability of human sources,
including the source’s motivation, evaluation, payment, and background.81
Following Charkaoui II, this information must also be disclosed to SAs. In
75. Re Harkat, 2009 FC 204 at para 13, [2009] 4 FCR 370 [Harkat, (22 December 2008)].
76. R v Scott, [1990] 3 SCR 979 at 995-96, 116 NR 361; Named Person v Vancouver Sun,
2007 SCC 43 at para 29, [2007] 3 SCR 253; Marks v Beyfus (1890), 25 QBD 494 at 498
(available on WL Can) (CCA).
77. Harkat, (22 December 2008), supra note 75 at para 12. See also Commission of Inquiry
Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, First Report: Security
and Information (Hull, Que: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980) at 41-47.
78. Harkat, (22 December 2008), supra note 75 at paras 25-48; R v Treu (1979), 104 DLR (3d)
524, 49 CCC (2d) 222, (Qc CA); Canada (Attorney General) v Ribic, 2003 FCA 246 at
para 6, [2005] 1 FCR 33; R v Ribic, 2008 ONCA 790, 238 CCC (3d) 225; Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), c 23, s 29(5)(e); National Security Information, 3 CFR §
166 (1982), s 4.1.
79. Harkat, (22 December 2008), supra note 75 at paras 25-31.
80. Ibid at para 46.
81. Re Harkat, 2005 FC 393 at paras 93-94, 98, 261 FTR 52.

924

(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

2009, the Ministers informed Justice Noël that they did not disclose to the court
that a CSIS informant had failed a polygraph test in 2001.82 What is more, a
CSIS employee had reworded the original report in 2008 to conceal this fact:
Whereas the original 2002 report indicated that the source in question was
untruthful “on all relevant questions,” a 2008 “quality control” assessment of the
test indicated that the source was truthful on half of the relevant questions and
that the answers to the other half should have been found inconclusive.83 The
official report disclosed to the Federal Court did not contain any account of this
revision or of the original results; the court only received the amended report.
The employee in question did not mention this ex post facto change when the
designated judge asked whether there was “anything unusual in the file relating
to the human sources.”84
Justice Noël considered this incident a “troubling” and “flagrant” violation of
procedural justice that impugned the integrity of the court.85 He lifted informer
privilege and ordered the disclosure of information about the human source to
the court and SAs, including information that might have revealed the informer’s
identity.86 He later ordered the disclosure of similar information on another
human source.87 Finally, he chose to rely on information provided by the human
source in question only when corroborated by extrinsic evidence.88 It was in
context of this breach of justice that SAs representing Mr. Harkat requested that
all information relating to the human source be excluded or, in the alternative,
that they be authorized to cross-examine the source.
The SCC reviewed Justice Noël’s decision on these matters in Harkat. On the
question of privilege, it decided that the functions of CSIS and police forces are
sufficiently distinct so as to preclude “automatically applying traditional police
informer privilege to CSIS human sources.”89 As noted by the Federal Court
of Appeal both in Re Harkat90 and in Canada (Attorney General) v Almalki,91
class privilege is a fairly rare and inflexible protection that does not easily fit the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Re Harkat, 2009 FC 553 at paras 1-3, 345 FTR 143 [Harkat, (27 May 2009)].
Re Harkat, [2010] 4 FCR 149 at paras 16-23.
Re Harkat, 2009 FC 1050 at para 27, [2010] 4 FCR 149 [Harkat, (15 October 2009)].
Harkat, (27 May 2009), supra note 82 at para 16; Harkat, (15 October 2009), supra note 84
at paras 62-68.
Harkat, (27 May 2009), supra note 82.
Harkat, (15 October 2009), supra note 84 at para 69.
Harkat, (9 December 2010), supra note 14, n 1.
Ibid at para 85.
2012 FCA 122, [2012] 3 FCR 635 [Harkat, (25 April 2012)].
2011 FCA 199 at paras 29-30, [2012] 2 FCR 594 [Almalki, (13 June 2011)].
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realities of security intelligence work. In contrast to the relationship inhering
between police and informers, those between CSIS employees and human sources
tend to be comparatively fluid, complex, and informal. Due to the categorical,
all-or-nothing nature of class privilege and the unique institutional and social
contexts of security intelligence work, the question of informer privilege would
best be left to Parliament rather than to courts.92 Parliament has since amended
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to prohibit the disclosure of the
identities of CSIS human sources or information from which their identities may
be inferred in any legal proceeding, including certificate proceedings. However,
a named person or SA may contest that the person concerned is a human source
or that certain information may not safely be disclosed.93
It remains to be seen whether this amendment will withstand Charter
scrutiny. It is worth noting here that the Court in Harkat stated that disclosure
of information pertaining to human sources would be only to persons with
security clearance who are obligated to maintain the confidentiality of the
information.94 On the one hand, this caveat is not likely to inhibit the ability
of CSIS to recruit new sources or otherwise to use traditional techniques for
acquiring and processing information. On the other, it helps SAs and judges
assess the reliability of evidence, most especially in light of above-noted instances
of misdirection. The rights of named persons may be dependent on the disclosure
of human source files and related information to SAs. It should also be noted
that designated judges take into account the fact that information from human
sources is hearsay when weighing the evidence.95
There remained two outstanding issues: (a) whether the destruction of
important source materials—including recordings of intercepted communications
used to link Mr. Harkat with known terrorists—rendered the proceedings against
Mr. Harkat unfair; and (b) whether the Ministers failed to discharge their duties
of candour and utmost good faith in failing to secure recent foreign intelligence
relevant to Mr. Harkat’s defence.
Pursuant to precedent established in the context of criminal law, the Ministers
have a duty to retain evidence relevant to the defence of the named person and
to explain the loss or destruction of such evidence; the failure to do so results in

92. Harkat, (25 April 2012), supra note 90 at paras 92-100; Almalki, (13 June 2011), supra note
90 at paras 20-26, 30.
93. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23, s 18.1(4) [CSIS Act].
94. Supra note 13 at para 83.
95. Ibid at para 90.
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a Charter breach.96 Given the law established in Charkaoui II, the destruction
of source files by CSIS constituted “unacceptable negligence,” amounting to a
breach of the Ministers’ disclosure obligations. Since this breach prejudiced Mr.
Harkat’s ability to make full answer and defence, it amounted to a violation of his
section 7 right to procedural fairness.97 A breach of this sort does not, however,
entail the right to a remedy—not even in the criminal law context. The provision
of a remedy is a question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Courts will
consider the nature and extent of the prejudice suffered,98 “the context of the rest
of the evidence and the position taken by the defence.”99
Mr. Harkat sought one of two remedies: a stay of proceedings or an order
excluding the summaries of the information contained in the destroyed files. The
former remedy was refused. The request for the latter remedy received differing
responses from the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the SCC.
In principle, the exclusion of evidence addresses any prejudice to the claimant
to the extent necessary to preserve the integrity of the justice system. Since
evidence may help courts perform their truth-seeking function despite producing
prejudicial effects, alternatives to exclusion are to be preferred.100 The Federal
Court refused to exclude the evidence on the grounds that summaries of the
original operational notes and recordings were reliable, and hence the prejudice
was minimal while the probative value was high. The Federal Court of Appeal
excluded the summaries, noting that the reliability of the summaries could not
be adequately tested and that the extent of the prejudice against Mr. Harkat was
therefore unknown.101
The SCC sided with the Federal Court on this issue. Without fully addressing
the concerns of the Federal Court of Appeal, it declared the summaries to be
reliable. It also noted that admission of the summaries would not adversely affect
the integrity of the justice system, as the destruction of the originals occurred
prior to Charkaoui II, pursuant to policies that had not yet been declared
unconstitutional. The destruction of the originals was, in other words, inadvertent
and understandable given the uncertainty of the law at the time.102
One wonders how the Court knew that the summaries were reliable without
comparing them with the originals. Presumably, the designated judge was able
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

R v La, [1997] 2 SCR 680 at paras 18-20, 148 DLR (4th) 608.
Harkat, supra note 13 at para 93.
Charkaoui II, supra note 12 at para 46.
R v Bradford, [2001] 139 OAC 341 at para 38, 52 OR (3d) 257.
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to corroborate the summaries by reference to closed material, but questions of
Ministerial compliance with its disclosure obligations, both prior to and following
Charkaoui II, raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of this method. It is
likely that the courts placed great weight on the good faith of CSIS employees
to, inter alia, accurately transcribe intercepted communications. The designated
judge would have carefully assessed the trustworthiness of relevant employees
responsible for the summaries when they were examined and cross-examined
during closed hearings.
Courts have adopted similarly deferential stances towards the Ministers
and CSIS employees in other certificate cases. In the case of Hassan Almrei, for
example, Justice Mosely found that the destruction of primary source material
(in this case, electronic surveillance) did not prejudice Mr. Almrei, as public
summaries kept him reasonably informed.103 It bears mentioning, though, that
signals intelligence did not form a prominent part of the Ministers’ case against
Mr. Almrei.104 It also bears mentioning that Justice Mosley admonished the
Ministers for a breach of candour for failing to include in their SIR information
that weakened or contradicted their case. To make matters worse, they seem to
have all but halted their investigation of Mr. Almrei after 2001, in the belief that
they did not need to routinely update their knowledge of Mr. Almrei and the risk
he posed to Canada. These failings were so severe that they resulted in a finding
that the certificate against Mr. Almrei was unreasonable.105
This brings us to the last issue. Mr. Harkat argued that the Ministers failed
to secure from foreign intelligence agencies relevant information regarding the
terrorists with whom he allegedly associated. This information could have been
used to identify weaknesses in the summaries and closed evidence, as well as to
provide a more up-to-date picture of the threat environment, Islamic extremism,
and the bin Laden network. All of this could have had a bearing on the
reasonableness of the certificate, at least by providing a fuller picture of whether
Mr. Harkat posed a threat to the security of Canada. Unsurprisingly, the foreign
intelligence agencies concerned refused the formal requests of the Ministers.106
The SCC did not find a breach of candour and good faith because, unlike in the
Almrei case, the Ministers made a reasonable effort to acquire this information.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Almrei, (14 December 2009), supra note 61 at para 491.
Ibid at para 491.
Ibid at paras 504-09.
For a copy of the letters of request sent, see Re Harkat, 2010 FC 1243, App A at paras
6-7, 380 FTR 255.
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What is more, the Court held that the Ministers have “no general obligation to
provide disclosure of evidence or information that is beyond their control.”107
C. SUMMARY

In sum, Harkat seems to have resulted in the constitutionalization of the certificate
regime. The legislative framework, including new provisions governing SAs, has
survived a “second look,”108 and the evolving practices of the Federal Court have
largely aligned with the principles elucidated in Charkaoui I and Charkaoui
II. While the IRPA provides for the possibility of an unfair process, this alone
does not render it unconstitutional—what matters is the manner in which it is
interpreted and applied. The Court directed designated (and appellate) judges
to tend to the constitutionality of certificate proceedings on a case-by-case basis,
using Charter principles, the language of the IRPA, and the evolving practices of
the Federal Court. Also at issue—although far less prominently—was the extent
to which the Ministers and CSIS complied with their statutory and constitutional
obligations. Importantly, the Court did not seriously review executive practices
or policies, focusing instead on the performance of legal institutions. Its concern
was primarily with encouraging and facilitating the comprehensive and coherent
application of internal norms by designated judges in order to better constrain
the actuality of executive decision making.
Designated judges have accordingly faced a steep learning curve. Amidst a
shifting constitutional and legislative landscape, they seem to have produced a
fairly consistent body of law concerning the interpretation and application of
the IRPA and the extent to which criminal law principles apply to certificate
proceedings. The evolving practices of the Federal Court have remained subject
to appeal and, in some instances, have been transformed into binding law
through the SCC’s judgments in Charkaoui I, Charkaoui II, and Harkat. In fact,
the Court’s judgments in these cases have served both as a framework for the
production of new practices (such as with disclosure following Charkaoui II) and
a means of clarifying and refining resultant jurisprudence.

107. Harkat, supra note 13 at para 103.
108. Kent Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007)
45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 169 at 174-76; Peter W Hogg, Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade
K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 6, 8, 19-25.
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III. TRULY EXCEPTIONAL? HARKAT, SURESH, AND
DEPORTATION TO TORTURE
The constitutionalization of certificates sits uneasily alongside the supposed status
of certificates as exceptional measures. A highly contested concept, exceptionality
may be loosely defined as a state in which a sovereign asserts power that transcends
the rule of law. Exceptional measures are, on this reading, those that cannot be
justified by reference to constitutional principles or autonomous legal values,
including the rule of law. Power is justified politically by reference to a real or
fictitious emergency that threatens the existence of a political community.109 But
it may also be justified by means of invalid, unsound, or insincere interpretations
of pre-existing legal norms.110 In this latter instance, the executive (and possibly
the legislative and executive branch) uses the form of law to rationalize injustice
while the substance of law remains absent.111
We should be quite ambivalent about the way the SCC has reviewed the
constitutionality of the certificate regime. On the one hand, Charkaoui I and
Charkaoui II have resulted in meaningful improvements to procedural rights,
including the provision of SAs and enhanced disclosure. In Harkat, the Court
improved the capacity of SAs to represent named persons by directing designated
judges to grant communication requests liberally, to safeguard solicitor-client
privilege, to ensure the provision of a minimum core of disclosure, and to be
vigilant against over-claiming of national security confidentiality. Coupled
with enhanced disclosure pursuant to Charkaoui II, these changes have been
meaningful. The permissibility of communication between SAs and named
persons, for example, has helped SAs directly refute the veracity of the Minister’s
allegations and supporting evidence rather than simply challenge the inferences
that may be drawn from the evidentiary record.112 The accuracy or correctness of
evidence is as important as—if not more important than—whether conclusions
drawn from the evidence are reasonable. Vigilance against over-claiming of

109. Gross, supra note 10; Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept
of Sovereignty, translated by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985) at 5-6.
110. Benjamin, supra note 10; Agamben, supra note 10.
111. Dyzenhaus, supra note 10 at 72; Agamben, supra note 10, ch 2.
112. For an example of where the SA system is better than in the United Kingdom, see Amnesty
International, Left in the Dark: The Use of Secret Evidence in the United Kingdom (London:
Amnesty International Publications, 2012), online: <www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/20000/eur450142012en.pdf>.
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confidentiality has also had powerful impacts, as evidenced by the quashing of
the certificate against Mr. Charkaoui113 and Mr. Almrei.114
On the other hand, there remain outstanding procedural issues. SAs remain
at a disadvantage, lacking the same levels of professional and administrative
support available to government lawyers. Whereas the latter may confer with
each other on cases and legal strategies, the former work alone, balancing their
roles as SAs with private practice. Prohibitions on communication between SAs
and named persons can adversely affect legal representation when one’s legal
strategy depends on the content of classified material—a problem again not faced
by government lawyers.
Less discussed is a host of outstanding substantive issues, including
protracted detentions, harm to dignity, and the risk of deportation to torture. In
Charkaoui I, the Court provided a short, doctrinally flat decision on the question
of discrimination115 but provided some guidance on the length of time for which
named persons may be detained.116 Following the Harkat decision and the
beginning phases of Mr. Harkat’s removal, the question of deportation to torture
has become the elephant in the room. Suresh ostensibly settled this issue in 2002,
when the Court held that it is “generally” unconstitutional to deport someone
to face a substantial risk of torture. However, it also decided that deportation to
torture would be permitted under “exceptional circumstances.”117 This is to say
that there is a presumption against deportation to torture, which the government
may rebut if it demonstrates evidence of a “serious threat to national security.”118
The Court specified that:
[A] person constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or she poses a
serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or indirect, and bearing in
mind the fact that the security of one country is often dependent on the security of
other nations. The threat must be “serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded
on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the
threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible.119

113.
114.
115.
116.

Re Charkaoui, supra note 59.
Almrei, (14 December 2009), supra note 61.
Supra note 11 at paras 129-32.
The Court held that lengthy “[e]xtended periods of detention under the certificate provisions
of the IRPA do not violate s[ections] 7 and 12 of the Charter if accompanied by a process
that provides regular opportunities for review of detention, taking into account all relevant
factors,” including the reasons for detention (ibid at para 110).
117. Suresh, supra note 15 at para 78.
118. Ibid at para 89.
119. Ibid at para 90.
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The Court was clear that determinations of risk are fact-based, political, and
entitled to deference if “the Minister is able to show evidence that reasonably
supports a finding of danger to the security of Canada.”120 Decisions concerning
the risk a person poses as well as whether that person may be safely removed from
Canada are findings of fact reviewable on a standard of patent unreasonableness.
The Court did not clarify what counts as an “exceptional circumstance,” stating
only that “[t]he ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any,
must await future cases.”121
I do not want to tread too heavily into thorny theoretical debates about the
exceptionality of certificates or deportation to torture. Instead, I would like to
take a moment to reflect on the relationship between Harkat and Suresh, both
in terms of what we may expect regarding the possible removal of Mr. Harkat
and, more generally, the intersection of procedural and substantive justice in the
context of security-based deportation proceedings.
A. BEYOND CERTIFICATES: THE (NON-)IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES ON ADJUDICATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY DECISION
MAKING

One of the principles elucidated with equal force in Suresh and the certificate
trilogy—as well as the foundational case of Singh v Minister of Employment and
Immigration122 —is that the greater the risk of substantive injustice associated
with a decision, the greater the procedural protections should be to which
affected persons are entitled. Moreover, there should be a reliable system for
ensuring that authoritative decision makers interpret and apply enabling
statutory provisions and regulations in a manner consistent with constitutional
principles. According to the SCC in the certificate trilogy, this vigilance is the
condition under which it will tolerate provisions and practices that provide for
the possibility of grave injustice. The “administrative” nature of a decision does
not justify inadequate procedural protections before removing persons to face
human rights abuses abroad.
The certificate trilogy shows that the actualization of this principle depends
on a deep institutional commitment to and broad-based internalization of
constitutional norms by relevant actors. Unfortunately, those who make decisions
about deportation to torture lack this commitment and supporting institutional
architecture. Consider the process by which people deemed security risks are
120. Ibid at para 85.
121. Ibid at para 78.
122. [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422.
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removed from Canada when there is a question of torture or similar abuse. The
first stage in this process involves a finding of inadmissibility, which can occur in
various ways. It may occur once a certificate has been found to be reasonable. Far
more often, it occurs following an admissibility hearing, a refugee claim hearing,
or a finding of inadmissibility by a Minister’s Delegate (MD) in the absence of
an oral hearing altogether.123 The Minister is always represented in admissibility
hearings and may intervene in refugee claim hearings for reasons that include
national security. When there is an issue of, inter alia, national security, section
86 of the IRPA states that:
The Minister may, during an admissibility hearing, a detention review or an appeal
before the Immigration Appeal Division, apply for the non-disclosure of information
or other evidence. Sections 83 and 85.1 to 85.5 apply to the proceeding with any
necessary modifications, including that a reference to “judge” be read as a reference
to the applicable Division of the Board.124

This provision ensures that ordinary proceedings presided over by an
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (“IRB”) member are conducted
expeditiously, informally, and with precisely the same legislative rules regarding
the admissibility of evidence and the non-disclosure of classified material as
used in certificate cases. They become, in other words, functional equivalents to
certificate proceedings.
Once an applicant has been deemed to be inadmissible, he or she is subject
to the second stage of removal. In most cases, an immigration official (“IO”)
will conduct a pre-removal risk assessment (“PRRA”) to determine whether an
applicant is at risk of persecution, torture, or similar abuse.125 IOs will look at
both the general human rights record of the country of origin and whether the
claimant faces a particularized, personal risk. If the IO determines that there
is a risk of persecution or torture, the third step involves the filing of a threat
assessment by an analyst in the National Security Division of the Intelligence
Directorate, CBSA. These two reports are then sent to an MD, while a redacted
copy is sent to the applicant. If the MD agrees with the report, he or she will
balance the danger the applicant poses to Canadian security with the risk of
torture the applicant faces if deported. In situations where there is a substantial
risk of torture, the MD will issue a “danger opinion” pursuant to section 115(2)
of the IRPA, thereby invoking the Suresh exception. There is no right to an oral
hearing concerning the issuance of a danger opinion, but affected persons are
123. IRPA, supra note 22, ss 44-45, 107, 107(1).
124. Ibid, s 86.
125. Ibid, ss 112-14.
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entitled to receive and submit written challenges against the information upon
which the decision is made (excluding information protected by national security
confidentiality). The applicant is also entitled to the reasons for the decision.126
We may usefully divide this process into two types. The first would be
adjudicative in nature and would include certificate proceedings, admissibility
hearings, detention reviews, and judicial reviews. Notice that these hearings relate
to the labelling of persons as security threats, are presided over by independent
and impartial adjudicators, and are both adversarial and oral. The second would
be discretionary, in which the Minister or the MD makes a decision independent
of an oral, adversarial hearing. Discretionary decisions relate to a range of subject
matter, but for our purposes, it is important to note that they are decisions
to remove persons who have been successfully labelled as security threats. This
means that final decisions about whether there is a substantial risk of torture or
similar abuse is a discretionary decision—albeit one that is notionally (though
in many cases, not practically) subject to judicial review. The principles of the
certificate trilogy seem to have had positive impacts on adjudicative decisions
to label someone a security threat, while Suresh has had little to no impact on
subsequent discretionary decisions to remove such persons in the context of
torture or similar abuse.
Section 86 of the IRPA, for instance, ensures that proceedings before the IRB
are subject to relevant provisions of Division 9 of the IRPA, even if the hearing
is not, strictly speaking, a certificate proceeding. As part of this process, IRB
adjudicators are authorized (and obligated) to appoint an SA.127 Importantly,
IRB members who preside over such hearings receive comprehensive training
in secret evidence and national security law, while all secret hearings before
the IRB involve an SA. Similarly, section 87.1 of the IRPA authorizes Federal
Court judges to appoint SAs during judicial reviews that include secret evidence.
This may occur during reviews of IRB decisions or of Ministerial decisions that
rested in part on sensitive information. Presumably, SAs are appointed when
secret evidence forms an important component of the decision under review.
Yet there have been cases where the Federal Court has refused to appoint an SA.
In the 2007 case of Segasayo v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), for instance, Justice Blais held that the provision of SAs during
126. Suresh, supra note 15.
127. Parliament elected to provide for the appointment of SAs before IRB members even though
the constitutionality of reliance on closed material during admissibility hearings was upheld
in the 2003 case of Sogi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). See Sogi v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1429, [2004] 2 FCR 427.
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the review of a Ministerial decision to deny an exemption was inappropriate.128
He reasoned, first, that “only those subject to a security certificate face detention
while awaiting a decision on their inadmissibility.”129 Second, the extent of closed
evidence in the case was much smaller than in a certificate hearing.130 Finally,
whereas the Court in Charkaoui I was concerned about deportation to torture,
those not named in certificates are less likely to face that risk because they may
still claim protection, either as a refugee or as a person in need of protection.131
Similarly, the Federal Court refused to appoint an SA in Kanyamibwa v Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), noting that the claimant in this case
was not at risk of torture or similar human rights abuses.132
I would cautiously say that the certificate trilogy has influenced adjudicative
proceedings outside the context of certificates per se. There may well be a process
of acculturation within the IRB that mirrors what has occurred within the Federal
Court. However, the rationale of the Federal Court in refusing to appoint an SA
during judicial reviews highlights some persistent and dangerous assumptions
about the substantive injustices faced by persons deemed inadmissible on
security grounds—even if the decision was right on the facts of a particular case.
First, it is untrue that only persons named in certificates are detained pending
determinations of admissibility. In point of fact, the CBSA regularly detains
asylum seekers alongside those whose refugee claims have been rejected.133
Problems with record keeping have prevented the isolation of the precise number
of asylum seekers who have been detained (as well as for how long and on what
grounds), as the CBSA classifies asylum seekers and persons whose claims have
been rejected under the same category.134 Nonetheless, Canada has been the
subject of repeated international criticism for increasing its detention of asylum
seekers, as well as for using provincial or municipal prisons for this purpose.135
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

134.
135.

2007 FC 372 at paras 28-29, [2008] 1 FCR 121.
Ibid at para 28.
Ibid at para 29.
Justice Blais stated that, unlike a security certificate, “even deportation is not a certainty in
this case, since the applicant has been recognized as a Convention refugee, and is thus subject
to section 115 of the Act” (ibid at para 28).
2010 FC 66 at paras 50-56, [2011] 1 FCR 423. See also Rajadurai v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 119, [2009] 3 FCR D-4.
Delphine Nakache, “The Human and Financial Cost of Detention of Asylum-Seekers in
Canada” (December 2011), online: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<www.unhcr.ca/beta/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RPT-2011-12-detention_assylum_
seekers-e.pdf> at 35-36.
The CBSA classifies both categories as “refugees” or “refugee claimants” (ibid).
Ibid at 24.
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What is most relevant for our purposes is that detention inhibits the capacity of
asylum seekers to make successful claims for protection, owing to such factors as
lack of access to counsel, family members, the Internet, supporting information,
or important documents.136
New measures allow for the automatic and mandatory twelve-month
detention of groups of persons whom the Minister deems to be “irregular
arrivals”—a category intended to apply to groups of persons believed to have
arrived through human smuggling or trafficking routes and who cannot be
examined or investigated in a timely manner.137 Section 55 of the IRPA authorizes
the detention of non-citizens whom an officer has reasonable grounds to believe
are inadmissible and a danger to the public or a flight risk. Foreign nationals may
be arrested and detained without a warrant, while permanent residents may simply
be detained without a warrant. Detentions are reviewed regularly,138 although the
continuation of detention may be ordered on the basis of closed material.139 What
is more, continued detentions are allowed if the CBSA is still conducting an
investigation, even if the grounds of the investigation do not relate to the initial
reasons for the detention.140 Section 55 has been used more frequently in recent
years, specifically in relation to irregular migrants arriving by boat.141 Finally,
the government has prolonged detentions by vigorously challenging decisions
to release affected persons. The detention continues until the challenge is finally
resolved, resulting in prolonged, if not indefinite, detention.142
The Federal Court may have also underestimated the extent to which
national security and other priorities related to risk management have affected the
examination and investigation of irregular migrants. Two agencies are involved
here: CSIS and CBSA. CSIS is, of course, the primary source of intelligence
in certificate cases, but it may also investigate any applicant who poses a threat

136. Ibid at 55.
137. See IRPA, supra note 22, ss 20.1, 55(3.1); Jennifer Bond, “Failure to Report: The Manifestly
Unconstitutional Nature of the Human Smugglers Act” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 377.
138. The Immigration Division reviews detentions within the first forty-eight hours and seven
days, and then again every 30 days. See IRPA, supra note 22, s 57.
139. Ibid, ss 83(1)(c)-(d), (i).
140. Ibid, s 58(1)(c).
141. Nakache, supra note 133 at 58.
142. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v B386, 2011 FC 175 at para 11,
[2012] 4 FCR 220.
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to national security.143 In fact, most files are handled by the CBSA, which has
grown considerably in size and sophistication since it was established in 2003.
The CBSA is authorized to examine and investigate all applicants who may be
inadmissible on security and other grounds. In these cases, CBSA officers rely
on the Security Intelligence Section (SIS) of the Intelligence Operations and
Analysis Division of the CBSA for intelligence and other information.144 Officers
also receive assistance from the National Security Screening Division (NSSD)
of the International Operations Directorate of the CBSA, if foreign intelligence
or information is needed.145 The SIS and NSSD conduct independent security
intelligence and information gathering, risk assessments, and investigations146
using human sources (including confidential informants),147 signals intelligence,148
and foreign intelligence. The CBSA is also legislatively authorized to participate
in bilateral correspondence and information sharing with agencies operating
within an applicant’s country of origin.149
In recent years, the CBSA has increasingly focused on the intersection of
criminality and (irregular) migration, employing technologies and practices
similar to those used by police services.150 It has a Criminal Investigations
Division and partners with domestic and foreign police services through “Joint

143. This is part of its statutory mandate to “provide security assessments to departments of the
Government of Canada” and to “conduct such investigations as are required for the purpose
of providing security assessments.” See CSIS Act, supra note 93, ss 13(1), 15(1); Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, ENF 2/OP 18: Evaluating Inadmissibility (Ottawa: Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, 2013), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/enf/
enf02-eng.pdf> at 49-50.
144. Ibid at 19.
145. Ibid at 15.
146. Arar Report, supra note 43; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor
General of Canada to the House of Commons (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor Genegal, 2007),
online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/20071005c_e.pdf>, ch 5.
147. Jim Bronskill, “Canada’s border agency enlisting informants, prompts internal review,”
Canadian Press (15 January 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/01/15/
canadas_border_agency_enlisting_informants_prompts_internal_review.html>.
148. Canada Border Services Agency, Policy on the Overt Use of Audio-Video Monitoring and
Recording Technology (Ottawa: Canada Border Services Agency, 2011), online: <assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/372080/cbsa-policy-on-overt-use-of-av-aug2011.pdf >.
149. Canada Border Services Agency Act, SC 2005, c 38, s 13 [CBSA Act]. See also Jon Woodward,
“Canada deported man to torture in Sri Lanka: affidavit,” CTV News (8 October 2013),
online: <bc.ctvnews.ca/canada-deported-man-to-torture-in-sri-lanka-affidavit-1.1489741>.
150. Canadian Border Services Agency, CBSA Enforcement Manual, No 1 (Ottawa: Canada
Border Services Agency, 30 April 2009) at 2-6, online: <vancouverlaw.ca/resources/
Customs-Enforcement-Manual-1-of-3.pdf>, ch 1.
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Force Operations.”151 The CBSA thus engages in both security intelligence
and law-enforcement activities, but in this case, both functions are housed
within the same agency. This arrangement mirrors the blurring of the roles and
responsibilities of CSIS and the RCMP and is reminiscent of pre-CSIS years when
security intelligence was collected by the RCMP. It should be recalled that the
rights impacts associated with this ambiguity motivated the SCC, in Charkaoui
II, to impose upon CSIS standards of disclosure normally applicable to police
agencies. It should also be noted that a foundational principle of national security
since the MacDonald Commission is that security intelligence and policing be
kept separate.152 Importantly, the CBSA is not yet subject to independent review
nor has there been significant Charter review of its activities.153
Thus, “ordinary” proceedings and certificate proceedings rest on the same
substratum of executive practices regarding detention, intelligence gathering,
and intelligence sharing. As in the certificate context, these practices can lead
to arrest, detention, prosecution, and possibly grave human rights abuses
following removal. After the arrival of the MV Sun Sea, for example, Canada
removed Sathyapavan “Sathi” Aseervatham on the basis of past criminality and
his involvement in organizing the MV Sun Sea’s voyage. There are reports that
Sathi was immediately detained by Sri Lankan authorities upon his arrival and
subsequently tortured.154 Given that refugee determination hearings are private,
it is unclear how Sri Lankan authorities knew of the timing of his arrival or
why they suspected him of being linked to terrorist organizations. It has been
suggested that the CBSA shared identity documents with Sri Lankan authorities,

151. Canada Border Services Agency, CBSA Participation in Joint Force Operations: Evaluation
Study, (Ottawa: Canada Border Services Agency, 9 February 2012), online: <www.cbsa-asfc.
gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2012/jfo-opc-eng.pdf>.
152. Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police: Second Report: Freedom and Security under the Law, vol 1 (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services Canada, 1981); Wesley K Wark, “Canada and the Intelligence
Revolution” in Heike Bungert, Jan G Heitmann & Michael Wala, eds, Secret Intelligence in
the Twentieth Century (Portland, Oreg: Frank Cass, 2003) 170.
153. For a list of good suggestions about how to enhance the review of the CBSA, see British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association, “Backgrounder” (5 March 2014), online: <bccla.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/03/20140305-CBSA-accountability-release-backgrounder.pdf>.
154. CBSA Act, supra note 149.

938

(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

possibly in order to complete its investigations.155 The Federal Court has on several
occasions allowed this practice, despite the risk it poses to asylum seekers.156
This brings us to common presumptions about the nature and frequency of
deportations to torture or similar abuse. Justice Blais asserted that those named
in certificates are more likely than others to face this risk. It turns out this is not
true: Persons named in certificates have in fact been comparatively less likely to
face this risk. In Mahjoub v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),157
Justice Dawson held that a danger opinion issued against Mr. Mahjoub was
unreasonable, on the grounds that there was an inadequate factual foundation
for the assertion that he posed a danger to the security of Canada. The MD
in question relied only on the narratives contained in the Minister’s SIR and
the fact that the certificate issued against Mr. Mahjoub had been found to be
reasonable in 2001. She was not, however, provided with confidential reference
appendices that would have placed the narrative in fuller context and provided
more up-to-date information regarding the danger Mr. Mahjoub posed to
Canada after having been publicly labelled as a terrorist and detained for years.
The court noted that one’s past activities may render one inadmissible. However,
the court also noted that:
The effect of the passage of time, and the effect of the person’s apprehension and
detention, should be considered so that … their future behaviour may be assessed.
It may be, for example, that the fact of apprehension and disclosure of a person’s
associations or activities will neutralize their future ability to conduct clandestine
activities.158

Similar rulings were made in the cases of Re Jaballah159 and Almrei v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).160 Subsequent cases involving Mr.
Mahjoub have dealt more squarely with the substantive issue of deportation to
torture. After reconsidering the file in light of a fuller factual record that included
closed material, an MD again concluded that Mr. Mahjoub posed a threat to
Canadian security and that he could be safely removed from Canada. In 2006,
155. Canadian Council for Refugees, “CCR expresses deep concerns over Canadian response
to Sri Lankans fleeing human rights abuses” (11 October 2013), online: <ccrweb.ca/en/
public-statement/2013-10-11>.
156. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v X, 2010 FC 1095, 375 FTR 204, Phelan
J; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v X, 2010 FC 1009, 193 ACWS (3d)
1285, Lemieux J.
157. 2005 FC 156, [2005] 3 FCR 334.
158. Ibid at para 55.
159. 2006 FC 1230 at paras 72-86, [2007] 2 FCR D-8.
160. 2005 FC 355 at paras 83-94, [2005] 4 FCR D-3 [Almrei, (11 March 2005)].
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Justice Tremblay-Lamer upheld the former determination but quashed the
decision on the grounds that it was unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Mahjoub
would not face a substantial risk of torture if deported. The onus of proving a risk
of torture is on the claimant, who must provide evidence concerning the human
rights record of the home state as well as a personalized risk (i.e., a risk that
is greater than that of the general population). Justice Tremblay-Lamer found
that the MD had “selectively relied on information that went against the bulk
of the evidence in concluding there was no institutionalized torture in Egypt”
and arbitrarily rejected “important, credible evidence on this issue.”161 A similar
judgment was made in the case of Mr. Almrei.162
All other instances of deportation to torture have occurred outside the
context of certificates. The case of Sogi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)163 is an especially good example. Immigration officials decided in
2003 and in 2005 that Mr. Bachan Singh Sogi (who previously had been deemed
inadmissible for reasons relating to national security) would face a substantial
risk of torture should he be returned to India.164 The MD issued a danger
opinion, asserting that Mr. Sogi could nonetheless be deported pursuant to the
Suresh exception. The Federal Court quashed the danger opinion on grounds
unrelated to the justifications offered in support of deportation to torture.165 The
government subsequently reassessed the risk, and, in 2006, an MD decided that
Mr. Sogi could now be safely removed. The Federal Court refused to grant a stay
of removal pending a review of the reasonableness of this decision.166 During this
process, the United Nations Committee Against Torture (“CAT”) twice requested
that Canada stay the removal until it had time to issue its own decision on the
case. Canada ignored these requests and deported Mr. Sogi anyway. Shortly
thereafter, the CAT issued an advisory opinion that there was in fact a substantial

161. Mahjoub v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1503 at para 68,
[2007] 4 FCR 247.
162. Almrei, (11 March 2005), supra note 160 at paras 57-62.
163. 2004 FC 853, [2005] 3 FCR 517.
164. Ibid at para 3.
165. Ibid at paras 18-21.
166. Bachan Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 799 at paras 3-8
(available on WL Can).
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risk of torture.167 It has been reported that Mr. Sogi was “imprisoned, beaten and
subjected to ill-treatment” after his removal.168
In Dadar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),169 an MD
decided that the claimant would not face a substantial risk of torture if returned
to Iran. The claimant applied to the CAT, who found that he did in fact face a
substantial risk of torture.170 The Federal Court refused to intervene or to grant a
stay of proceedings in light of the CAT’s views.171 In 2011, the CAT again found
that the decision of an MD was erroneous, this time in the case of Somali national
Jama Warsame.172 In 2007, an immigration officer had found that Mr. Warsame
would face a substantial risk of torture if returned to Somalia, in part because of
widespread and systematic human rights abuses. There was a personalized risk,
as Mr. Warsame had never been to Somalia (he was born in Egypt and had lived
in Canada since the age of four), did not speak local languages, and had no
resources upon which to rely for safety. Subsequently, an MD decided that there
was in fact no personalized risk. Importantly, Mr. Warsame could not have the
decision of the MD judicially reviewed because he lacked the financial capacity
to hire a lawyer.173 He was fortunate enough to have secured refugee status while
in transit in the Netherlands, raising questions about the correctness (if not the
good faith) of the MD’s determination.174
In Muhammad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),175 there was a
serious issue of political interference with respect to an MD’s finding that
the claimant, Arshad Muhammad, was not at risk of torture if returned to
Pakistan. The claimant had initially been denied refugee status in 2003 due to
167. Decision: Communication No 297/2006, UN Committee Against Torture, 39th Sess, Annex,
UN Doc CAT/C/39/D/297/2006 (2007), online: <www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/
cat_2007_sogi_vs_canada.pdf>.
168. Amnesty International Canada, “Matching International Commitments with National
Action: A Human Rights Agenda for Canada” (December, 2012), online: <www.amnesty.ca/
sites/default/files/amnesty_humanrights_v6.pdf> at 20.
169. 2004 FC 1381, 134 ACWS (3d) 470 [Dadar, (12 October 2004)].
170. Decision: Communication No 258/2004, UN Committee Against Torture, 35th Sess, Annex,
UN Doc CAT/C/35/D/258/2004 (2005), online: <www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=CAT/C/35/D/258/2004> [Communication No 258/2004].
171. Dadar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 382,
147 ACWS (3d) 277.
172. Views: Communication No. 1959/2010, UN Human Rights Committee, 102d Sess, Annex,
UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010 (2011), online: <www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010>.
173. Ibid at para 2.6.
174. Amnesty International Canada, supra note 168 at 21.
175. Muhammad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 448, 242 ACWS (3d) 896.
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his membership in a terrorist organization. He fled, spending the next eight
years in hiding. In 2011, he was apprehended after his name and picture had
been posted on the CBSA’s “Most Wanted” website. An IO prepared a PRRA
and concluded that Muhammad faced a personal risk of torture due to the fact
that the allegations against him were widely publicized and likely known by
Pakistani authorities.176 The claimant argued before the Federal Court that the
MD’s decision was unreasonable, owing in part to political interference. Among
the noted irregularities was a highly unusual meeting between the MD and the
Director General of the Border Operations of CBSA, Glenda Lavergne, before
the MD had rendered her decision. Court-ordered disclosure of correspondence
revealed that Lavergne had expressed concern that a positive finding would
affect the reputation and viability of the most wanted list.177 The Court found
that the MD’s decision to ignore the PRRA was unreasonable because it was
unsupported by the factual record. It also ruled, however, that there was no
reasonable apprehension of bias and that there was insufficient evidence of a lack
of independence and impartiality.178
These cases highlight a serious lack of consistency and that the decisions
of IOs and MDs are not always well supported by factual records. In some
situations, persons have been recognized by IOs to be in need of protection, only
to have MDs make the opposite finding under highly politicized circumstances.
Consistency is hampered by a host of institutional barriers pervasive within
immigration and refugee law, including the financial inability of most refugee
claimants to hire lawyers,179 the elimination or reduction of rights to appeal, the
prevalence of expedited refugee claim hearings, the use of Designated Countries
of Origin criteria, the refusal of the Federal Court to order stays of removal
pending reviews of Ministerial decisions, and the inconsistency of Federal
Court decisions on the certification of applications for judicial review of such
decisions.180 Another difficulty is that claimants must adduce evidence both of
the general human rights record of their country of origin and a particularized,
personal risk. Since decisions of the MD on questions of fact are reviewable only

176.
177.
178.
179.

Ibid at para 7.
Ibid at paras 111-23.
Ibid at paras 145-56.
On the correlation between legal representation and successful refugee claims, see Sean
Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determinations System: An Empirical
Assessment” (2011) 49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 71.
180. Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012)
38:1 Queen’s LJ 1.
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on a standard of unreasonableness, it is quite possible for there to be incorrect but
reasonable decisions concerning the risk of torture.
All of this is to say that certificates are just one component of a far broader
set of measures by which the state investigates, detains, and deports non-citizens
deemed to be security risks. Together with certificates, rather ordinary measures
that have long been a part of our immigration and refugee law framework
form part of an alternate legal order organized around an interconnected
set of legislative provisions and executive practices highly attuned to security.
While cases such as Charkaoui I, Charkaoui II, Harkat, and Suresh establish
constitutional boundaries of security-based detention and deportation practices,
the institutional framework necessary for minimal adherence to the rule of law
seem to have been strenuously applied only to the most conspicuous part of this
alternate order—certificates. The usual justification for this (i.e., that certificates
are an exceptional case) is unpersuasive, as the risk of deportation to serious
human rights abuses is actually higher for those whose removal begins through
ordinary processes than for those named in certificates.
B. WHERE TO FROM HERE? REVISITING SURESH

Some of these issues may be resolved by revisiting Suresh. The likelihood of this
happening is uncertain, as some Federal Court judges have been reluctant to
seriously engage with the question of torture abroad, on the dubious grounds that
these are extraterritorial matters and hence beyond the reach of the Charter.181
With a fuller factual record of the intersection of security, migration, and torture
post-9/11, the emergence of new domestic and international norms, a less
heightened sense of emergency, and the best practices of foreign jurisdictions at its

181. Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2008 FCA 401,
[2009] 4 FCR 149; Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in
Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3
McGill LJ 663; Eva Kapustovà, Different Perceptions of the Obligation not to Refoule: The
European and the Canadian Approach (LLM Short Thesis, Central European University,
2012) [unpublished]; Kent Roach, “The Dangerous Game of Complicity in Torture” (2012)
58:3 & 4 Crim LQ 303.
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disposal, 182 the SCC would be justified in finding that principles of fundamental
justice have developed to such a degree that deportation to torture is no longer
permissible under any circumstance.183 What would this mean?
One answer is that Canada would explore the feasibility of seeking
“diplomatic assurances” against torture, much as it does with respect to extradition
to countries that impose capital punishment. The Court has said very little
about the adequacy of assurances. International perspectives shed light on this
issue. In Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom,184 the United Kingdom
tested the tolerance of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) for
assurances. The ECHR held that there are circumstances in which assurances
reduce the personalized risk of torture to the point that deportation is legally
permissible. This applies even when the state that provides the assurance engages
in systematic, widespread torture.185 The strength of assurances must be assessed
in consideration of the following factors:
1. [W]hether the terms of the assurances have been disclosed
to the Court… ;
2. [W]hether the assurances are specific or are general and vague… ;
3. [W]ho has given the assurances and whether that person can bind
the receiving State… ;
182. Arar Report, supra note 43; House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, Review of the Findings and Recommendation Arising from the Iacobucci and
O’Connor Inquiries (June 2009) (Chair: Garry Breitkreuz); Nathalie Des Rosiers & Sukanya
Pillay, “Report to the UN Committee Against Torture 48th Session, May 2012: Regarding
List of Issues to be Considered in Connection of the Sixth Periodic Report of Canada
(CAT/C/CAN/6)” Canadian Civil Liberties Association (April 2012), online: <ccla.org/
cclanewsite/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CCLA-UNCAT-MAY-2012.pdf>; Report
of the Committee against Torture, UNGAOR, 66th Sess, Supp No 44, UN Doc A/66/44,
(2011); Aoife Duffy, “Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law”
(2008) 20:3 Int’l J Refugee L 373; Thomas Poole, “Recent Developments in the ‘War on
Terrorism’ in Canada” (2007) 7:3 HRL Rev 633; Alex Neve, “Extraordinary Rendition, the
Canadian Edition: National Security and Challenges to the Global Ban on Torture” (2007)
2:1 Societies Without Borders 117; Vijay M Padmanabhan, “To Transfer or Not to Transfer:
Identifying and Protecting Relevant Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement” (2011)
80:1 Fordham L Rev 73; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Expulsions
of Aliens in International Human Rights Law” (September 2006), online: <www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/Discussion-paper-expulsions.pdf>.
183. For commentary on this point, see Craig Forcese “Touching Torture with a Ten Foot Pole:
The Legality of Canada’s Approach to National Security Information Sharing with Human
Rights-Abusing States” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 263.
184. No 8139/09, [2012] ECHR 56, 55 EHRR 1 [Othman].
185. Ibid at para 193.
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4. [I]f the assurances have been issued by the central government of
the receiving State, whether local authorities can be expected to
abide by them… ;
5. [W]hether the assurances concerns treatment that is legal or illegal
in the receiving State… [;]
6. [W]hether they have been given by a Contracting State… ;
7. [T]he length and strength of bilateral relations between the sending
and receiving States, including the receiving State’s record in abiding
by similar assurances… ;
8. [W]hether compliance with the assurances can be objectively
verified through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms,
including providing unfettered access to the applicant’s lawyers… ;
9. [W]hether there is an effective system of protection against torture
in the receiving State, including whether it is willing to cooperate
with international monitoring mechanisms (including international
human rights NGOs), and whether it is willing to investigate
allegations of torture and to punish those responsible… ;
10. [W]hether the applicant has previously been ill-treated in the
receiving State… ; and
11. [W]hether the reliability of the assurances has been examined by
the domestic courts of the sending/Contracting State… .186
While in this case the assurances were complied with, many view assurances as
inherently unreliable.187 There is no shortage of cases in which countries have not
abided by their promises to respect human rights. In Agiza v Sweden,188 Sweden
was found to be in contravention of international law when it deported Ahmed
Agiza to Egypt on the strength of an assurance against torture. Once returned,
Agiza was subject to beatings and electronic shocks. The most relevant example
would, of course, be that of Maher Arar, who was subjected to torture after he
was “returned” to Syria by the United States on the strength of an assurance
against torture.
In my view, the most valuable approach would be to improve the institutional
architecture employed to examine asylum seekers to ensure that decisions about
186. Ibid at para 189.
187. Human Rights Watch, “‘Diplomatic Assurances’ Against Torture: Questions and
Answers” (November 2006), online: <www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
ecaqna1106web.pdf>.
188. Decision: Communication No 233/2003, UN Committee Against Torture, 34th Sess, Annex,
UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), online: <www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=CAT/C/34/D/233/2003>.
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the risk of torture are based on law and the facts, and to provide more adequate
mechanisms for the review of these decisions (and underlying intelligence
practices). This could happen in various ways, including greater disclosure during
security-based admissibility, detention review, and refugee claim hearings. There
is some indication that the Federal Court is moving in this direction. In Seyoboka
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),189 Justice de Montigny
found that those facing allegations of international criminality and other serious
charges in the context of adversarial IRB hearings are entitled to “a high degree of
procedural fairness”190 and expanded disclosure, pursuant to Charkaoui II. Relying
on this case, Justice Harrington found in B135 v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration)191 that the Minister was obligated to disclose certain evidence
to an IRB member during a refugee claim hearing concerning a passenger of
the MV Sun Sea. This evidence indicated that several passengers who had been
returned to Sri Lanka were detained, beaten, and subjected to ill-treatment and
that the whereabouts of one passenger was unknown.192
International and foreign standards are also relevant to the processes by which
MDs make decisions about the risk of torture, especially when those decisions are
based on material that may not be disclosed to the affected person. The ECHR
and other international and foreign courts have recently ruled that asylum
seekers do not have the right of access to closed material upon which decision
makers rely when determining the risk of torture.193 However, this decision was
predicated in part on the fact that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(“SIAC”) in the United Kingdom makes final decisions about risk of torture
after an oral hearing in which the interests of affected persons are represented
by SAs. The SIAC—which is responsible for reviewing decisions of the UK
government with respect to detention and deportation—is composed of a judge,
a senior member of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, and a layperson
with expertise in national security and independent adjudicators. The SA system
adopted in Canada was modeled in large part after the SIAC system. Unlike in
the United Kingdom, though, our SA system has been effectively confined to
adjudicative proceedings and does not extend to Ministerial decisions about the
risk of torture. We might consider employing something similar to the SIAC
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
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system in cases in which deportation to torture intersects with national security
or similar imperatives (i.e., make decisions to deport in the context of torture less
discretionary and more adjudicative).
In the alternative, courts should reconsider the adoption of deferential
stances towards the findings of MDs in the context of security. With respect,
the Canadian government has lost trust on this issue, owing to its roles in
the torture of Maher Arar, Abdullah Almaki, Ahmad El Maati and Muayyed
Nureddin; the human rights abuses perpetrated against Omar Khadr; the Afghan
Detainee issue; and recently publicized documents concerning the CSIS stance
on the permissibility of relying on torture for “actionable” intelligence.194 Matters
have not been improved by the Canadian government’s disrespect for the roles
and responsibilities of the CAT. In three cases, Canada deported persons despite
the fact that the CAT found there to be a substantial risk of torture. In one
case, the affected person was deported notwithstanding this finding, and in
another, the affected person was removed before the committee had concluded
its deliberations. In this latter case, two requests for a temporary suspension of
removal were ignored.195 It is true that the views of the CAT are not binding,
but they may be viewed in some measure as findings of fact, or at least bases for
appraising the reasonableness of decisions of IOs and MDs. Insofar as there were
substantial risks of torture in these cases, and no good reason provided as to why
the Suresh exception applied, the removal of these men was arguably contrary
to the Charter.

IV. CONCLUSION
If viewed simply within the context of SCC judgments and Division 9 of the
IRPA, the certificate regime may seem to be unique. It is perhaps on the basis of
its putatively distinctive form, in addition to its grave implications for human
rights, that the SCC thrice imposed stringent constitutional constraints on the
decisions of those operating within this setting. Yet certificates remain but one
part of a larger process by which migration in general—and irregular migration
in particular—has been securitized. It is worth remembering that Parliament
transferred jurisdiction over certificate proceedings from SIRC to the Federal
Court following an emergency session that was convened to deal with the
irregular arrival of 174 Sikh asylum seekers in 1987.196 In the late 1980s and
194. Forcese, supra note 183.
195. Communication No 258/2004, supra note 170; Dadar, (12 October 2004), supra note 169.
196. Colson, supra note 5 at 134.
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early 1990s, Parliament, CSIS, the Department of National Defence, and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade all identified irregular
migration as a distinct security threat for the first time, owing in part to the
threats posed by terrorism.197
Irregular migration—which may be defined as the process by which people
enter or reside in a country without that country’s legal permission198—has since
risen high on Canada’s national security agenda. We have responded with “smarter”
approaches to border control characterized by a number of themes, including
greater emphasis on risk management, enhanced surveillance and screening of
migrants,199 and greater information sharing and institutional cooperation at
the domestic and international levels.200 Following the widely publicized arrivals
of two boats of Tamil asylum seekers on Canadian shores in 2009 and 2010,
organizational changes and capacities have been further influenced by legislation.
Parliament has tightened restrictions on irregular migrants through a range
of preventive and deterrent measures, such as visa regimes, carrier sanctions,
expedited refugee claim hearings, limitations on rights of appeal, Designated
Country of Origin criteria, the criminalization of irregular entry, mandatory
detention for groups of migrants classified as “irregular arrivals,” enhanced
surveillance, and biometrics.201
Certificates are perhaps the most conspicuous but far from the only, oldest,
or most commonly used of these measures. The disaggregation of certificates from
this larger context is evident in the way in which discussions about them have
197. Ibid at 132-38; Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters,” supra note 5; Sherene H Razack, “‘Simple
Logic’: Race, the Identity Documents Rule and the Story of a Nation Besieged and Betrayed”
(2000) 15 JL & Soc Pol’y 181; Reginald Whitaker, “Refugees: The Security Dimension”
(1998) 2:3 Citizenship Stud 413 at 427; Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Welcome/STAY OUT: The
Contradiction of Canadian Integration and Immigration Policies at the Millennium” (1998)
30:3 Can Ethnic Stud 190; Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity:
Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization (Peterborough, Ont:
Broadview Press, 2002); Rose Baaba Folson, ed, Calculated Kindness: Global Economic
Restructuring and Immigration and Settlement in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood, 2004); Anna
Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).
198. Bastian A Vollmer, “Policy Discourses on Irregular Migration in the EU – ‘Number Games’
and ‘Political Games’” (2011) 13:3 Eur J Migr & L 317.
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the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness (Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2011), online: <actionplan.gc.ca/sites/eap/files/bap_report-paf_
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been structured by the grammar of constitutional rights and principles germane
to criminal law. This disaggregation has produced a rather unique institutional
approach to managing the intersections among security, migration, and asylum.
Factors influencing the constitutionalization of certificates include concerted
social and political mobilization, powerful legal advocacy, media awareness, and
the internalization and operationalization of human rights norms by judges of
the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, and SCC. The authenticity and
quality of this institutional experiment is open to question, but a strong case can
be made that executive decision making has been subjected to the rule of law. In
any event, after Harkat, the current regime is likely to be as good as it gets.
But the construction of this regime may have come at the cost of bracketing
some important substantive justice issues, as well as how these issues are and
are not handled by decision makers in analogous institutional settings. At best,
the certificate trilogy stands for the principle that named persons are entitled
to heightened procedural fairness by virtue of the impact that security-based
detentions and deportations have on life, liberty, and security of the person. High
on this list are the ways in which being labelled a terrorist heightens the risk of
persecution, torture, and similar abuses among those who are returned to certain
countries. What is hard to fathom is why one would think that this impact is
unique to certificates or that it is any more tolerable when it arises pursuant to
ordinary immigration and refugee law measures. Why have procedural safeguards
been heightened in the former context but not (or even reduced) in the latter?
Throughout the certificate trilogy, the Court has stated that the applicability
of Charter principles depends on the impacts that laws, policies, and practices
have on the integrity of affected persons, not on how one formally classifies
those laws (e.g., as criminal or administrative). It was on the basis of subsequent
analogies between certificates and security intelligence agencies, on the one
hand, and criminal proceedings and law-enforcement agencies, on the other,
that the Court applied principles germane to the latter and to the former. Yet
the migration of human rights norms from criminal to certificate contexts has
not been followed by the migration of rights from certificates to functionally
connected or even equivalent proceedings. The reasons offered for this have
typically involved formal, if not hierarchical, distinctions between certificates and
all other security-based detention and deportation proceedings. These distinctions
rest on dubious assumptions about the putatively lighter impacts the latter have
on the rights of asylum seekers. Similarly, the practices of the CBSA have hitherto
not received the same level of independent judicial or administrative review as
CSIS in this context.
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It is for these reasons that one would do well to analyze Harkat, not just
for what it says about the certificate regime but for what it can and should say
about other, neglected corners of the security and migration nexus. If the Court
is serious that the very real risks of substantive injustice faced by named persons
necessitate procedural safeguards at least as robust as those now used in certificate
proceedings, and if (as the evidence shows) this risk is at least as great for those
caught up in more ordinary proceedings, then it should prioritize ensuring the
more effective operationalization of the principles it laid down in Suresh. Absent
movement in this area, the procedural gains made in the context of reviews of the
reasonableness of certificates will be vastly outweighed by the continued existence
of woefully inadequate procedures by which decisions about deportation to
torture are made and reviewed. This will only increase the sense among skeptics
that the constitutionalization of the certificate regime uses the form of law to
mask the emptying out of its substance.

